In 1876, Lewis Carroll proposed a voting system in which the winner is the candidate who with the fewest changes in voters' preferences becomes a Condorcet winner-a candidate who beats all other candidates in pairwise majority-rule elections. Bartholdi, Tovey, and Trick provided a lower bound-NP-hardness-on the computational complexity of determining the election winner in Carroll's system. We provide a stronger lower bound and an upper bound that matches our lower bound. In particular, determining the winner in Carroll's system is complete for parallel access to NP, that is, it is complete for ⌰ 2 p , for which it becomes the most natural complete problem known. It
Introduction
The Condorcet criterion is that an election is won by any candidate who defeats all others in pairwise majority-rule elections [Condorcet 1785 ], see Black [1958] . The Condorcet Paradox, dating from 1785 [Condorcet 1785 ], notes that not only is it not always the case that Condorcet winners exist but, far worse, when there are more than two candidates, pairwise majority-rule elections may yield strict cycles in the aggregate preference even if each voter has non-cyclic preferences. 1 This is a widely discussed and troubling feature of majority rule (see, e.g., the discussion in Mueller [1989] ).
In 1876, Charles Lutwidge Dodgson-more commonly referred to today by his pen name, Lewis Carroll-proposed an election system that is inspired by the Condorcet criterion, 2 yet that sidesteps the above-mentioned problem [Dodgson 1876 ]. In particular, a Condorcet winner is a candidate who defeats each other candidate in pairwise majority-rule elections. In Carroll's system, an election is won by the candidate who is "closest" to being a Condorcet winner. In particular, each candidate is given a score that is the smallest number of exchanges of adjacent preferences in the voters' preference orders needed to make the candidate a Condorcet winner with respect to the resulting preference orders. Whatever candidate (or candidates, in the case of a tie) has the lowest score is the winner. This system admits ties but, as each candidate is assigned an integer score, no strict-preference cycles are possible. Bartholdi et al. [1989] in their paper "Voting Schemes for which It Can Be Difficult to Tell Who Won the Election" raise a difficulty regarding Carroll's election system. Though the notion of winner(s) in Carroll's election system is mathematically well defined, Bartholdi et al. raise the issue of what the computational complexity is of determining who is the winner. Though most natural election schemes admit obvious polynomial-time algorithms for determining who won, in sharp contrast Bartholdi et al. prove that Carroll's election scheme has the disturbing property that it is NP-hard to determine whether a given candidate has won a given election (a problem they dub DodgsonWinner), and that it is NP-hard even to determine whether a given candidate has tied-or-defeated another given candidate (a problem they dub DodgsonRanking). 1 The standard example is an election over candidates a, b, and c in which 1/3 of the voters have preference ͗a Ͻ b Ͻ c͘, 1/3 of the voters have preference ͗b Ͻ c Ͻ a͘, and 1/3 of the voters have preference ͗c Ͻ a Ͻ b͘. In this case, though each voter individually has well-ordered preferences, the aggregate preference of the electorate is that b trounces a, c trounces b, and a trounces c. In short, individually well-ordered preferences do not necessarily aggregate to a well-ordered societal preference. 2 Carroll did not use this term. Indeed, Black has shown that Carroll "almost beyond a doubt" was unfamiliar with Condorcet's work [Black 1958, pp. 193-194]. Bartholdi et al.'s NP-hardness results establish lower bounds for the complexity of DodgsonRanking and DodgsonWinner. We optimally improve their two complexity lower bounds by proving that both problems are hard for ⌰ 2 p , the class of problems that can be solved via parallel access to NP, and we provide matching upper bounds. Thus, we establish that both problems are ⌰ 2 p -complete. Bartholdi et al. explicitly leave open the issue of whether DodgsonRanking is NP-complete: ". . . Thus DodgsonRanking is as hard as an NP-complete problem, but since we do not know whether DodgsonRanking is in NP, we can say only that it is NP-hard" [Bartholdi et al. 1989, p. 161] . From our optimal lower bounds, it follows that neither DodgsonWinner nor DodgsonRanking is NP-complete unless the polynomial hierarchy collapses.
As to our proof method, in order to raise the known lower bound on the complexity of Dodgson elections, we first study the ways in which feasible algorithms can control Dodgson elections. In particular, we prove a series of lemmas showing how polynomial-time algorithms can control oddness and evenness of election scores, "sum" over election scores, and merge elections. These lemmas then lead to our hardness results.
We remark that it is somewhat curious finding "parallel access to NP"complete (i.e., ⌰ 2 p -complete) problems that were introduced almost one hundred years before complexity theory itself existed. In addition, DodgsonWinner, which we prove complete for this class, is extremely natural when compared with previously known complete problems for this class, essentially all of which have somewhat convoluted forms, for example, asking whether a given list of Boolean formulas has the property that the number of formulas in the list that are satisfiable is itself an odd number. In contrast, the class NP, which is contained in ⌰ 2 p , has countless natural complete problems. Also, we mention that Papadimitriou [1984] has shown that UniqueOptimalTravelingSalesperson is complete for P NP , which contains ⌰ 2 p .
Preliminaries
In this section, we introduce some standard concepts and notations from computational complexity theory [Papadimitriou 1994; Bovet and Crescenzi 1993; Garey and Johnson 1979] . NP is the class of languages solvable in nondeterministic polynomial time. The polynomial hierarchy [Meyer and Stockmeyer 1972; Stockmeyer 1977] , PH, is defined as PH ϭ P ഫ NP ഫ NP NP ഫ NP NP NP ഫ . . . where, for any class Ꮿ, NP Ꮿ ϭ ഫ CʦᏯ NP C , and NP C is the class of all languages that can be accepted by some NP machine that is given a black box that in unit time answers membership queries to C. The polynomial hierarchy is said to collapse if for some k the kth term in the preceding infinite union equals the entire infinite union. Computer scientists strongly suspect that the polynomial hierarchy does not collapse, though proving (or disproving) this remains a major open research issue.
The polynomial hierarchy has a number of intermediate levels. The ⌰ 2 p level of the polynomial hierarchy will be of particular interest to us. ⌰ 2 p , which was first studied by Papadimitriou and Zachos [1983] (see also Wagner [1990] ), is the class of all languages that can be solved via ᏻ(log n) queries to some NP set. Equivalently, and more to the point for the purposes of this paper, ⌰ 2 p equals the class of problems that can be solved via parallel access to NP [Hemachandra 1989; Köbler et al. 1987] , as explained formally later in this section. ⌰ 2 p falls between the first two levels of the polynomial hierarchy: NP ʕ ⌰ 2 p ʕ P NP ʕ NP NP . During the past decade, ⌰ 2 p has played a quite active role in complexity theory. Kadin [1989] has proven that if NP has a sparse Turing-complete set then the polynomial hierarchy collapses to ⌰ 2 p , Hemachandra and Wechsung have shown that the question of whether ⌰ 2 p and sequential access to NP yield the same class can be characterized in terms of Kolmogorov complexity [Hemachandra and Wechsung 1991], Wagner [1990] has shown that the definition of ⌰ 2 p is extremely robust, and Jenner and Torán [1995] have shown that the robustness of the class ⌰ 2 p seems to fail for its function analogs. Problems are encoded as languages of strings over some fixed alphabet ⌺ having at least two letters. ⌺* denotes the set of all strings over ⌺. For any string x ʦ ⌺*, let ͉x͉ denote the length of x. For any set A ʕ ⌺*, let A denote ⌺*‫گ‬ A. For any set A ʕ ⌺*, let ʈAʈ denote the cardinality of A. For any multiset A, ʈAʈ will denote the cardinality of A. For example, if A is the multiset containing one occurrence of the preference order ͗w Ͻ x Ͻ y͘ and seventeen occurrences of the preference order ͗w Ͻ y Ͻ x͘, then ʈAʈ ϭ 18. As is standard, for each language A ʕ ⌺* we use A to denote the characteristic function of A, that is,
. . ͘ be any standard, multi-arity, easily computable, easily invertible pairing function. We will also use the notation ͗ . . . ͘ to denote preference orders, for example, ͗w Ͻ x Ͻ y͘. Which use is intended will be clear from context. Whenever we speak of a function that takes a variable number of arguments, we will assume that the arguments, say a 1 , . . . , a z , are encoded as a 1 # . . . #a z #, where # is a symbol not in the alphabet in which the arguments are encoded. When speaking of a variable-arity function being polynomial-time computable, we mean that the function's running time is polynomial in ͉a 1 # . . . #a z #͉ ϭ z ϩ ͉a 1 ͉ ϩ . . . ϩ ͉a z ͉.
In computational complexity theory, reductions are used to relate the complexity of problems. Very informally, if A reduces to B that means that, given B, one can solve A. For any a and b such that Յ a b is a defined reduction type, and any complexity class
We refer readers to the standard source, Ladner, Lynch, and Selman [1975] , for definitions and discussion of the standard reductions. However, we briefly and informally present to the reader the definitions of the reductions to be used in this paper.
if there is a polynomialtime Turing machine that, on input x, computes a query that itself consists of a list of strings and, given that the machine after writing the query is then given as its answer a list telling which of the listed strings are in B, the machine then correctly determines whether x is in A (this is not the original Ladner-Lynch-Selman definition, as we have merged their querying machine and their evaluation machine; however, this formulation is common and equivalent). Since a Յ tt p -reducing machine, on a given input, asks all its questions in a parallel (also called nonadaptive) manner, the informal statement above that ⌰ 2 p captures the complexity of "parallel access to NP" can now be expressed formally as the claim ⌰ 2 p ϭ R tt p (NP), which is known to hold [Hemachandra 1989; Köbler et al. 1987 ]. As has become the norm, we always use hardness to denote hardness with respect to Յ m p reductions. That is, for any class Ꮿ and any problem A, we say that
For any class Ꮿ and any problem A, we say that A is Ꮿ-complete if A is Ꮿ-hard and A ʦ Ꮿ. Completeness results are the standard method in computational complexity theory of categorizing the complexity of a problem, as a Ꮿ-complete problem A is both in Ꮿ, and is the hardest problem in Ꮿ (in the sense that every problem in Ꮿ can be easily solved using A).
The Complexity of Dodgson Elections
Lewis Carroll's voting system [Dodgson 1876 ] (see also Niemi and Riker [1976] and Bartholdi et al. [1989] ) works as follows: Each voter has strict preferences over the candidates. Each candidate is assigned a score, namely, the smallest number of sequential exchanges of two adjacent candidates in the voters' preference orders (henceforth called switches) needed to make the given candidate a Condorcet winner. We say that a candidate c ties-or-defeats a candidate d if the score of d is not less than that of c. (Bartholdi et al. [1989] use the term "defeats" to denote what we, for clarity, denote by ties-or-defeats; though the notations are different, the sets being defined by Bartholdi et al. and in this paper are identical.) A candidate c is said to win the Dodgson-type election if c ties-or-defeats all other candidates. Of course, due to ties it is possible for two candidates to tie-or-defeat each other, and so it is possible for more than one candidate to be a winner of the election.
Recall that all preferences are assumed to be strict. A candidate c is a Condorcet winner (with respect to a given collection of voter preferences) if c defeats (i.e., is preferred by strictly more than half of the voters) each other candidate in pairwise majority-rule elections. Of course, Condorcet winners do not necessarily exist for a given set of preferences, but if a Condorcet winner does exist, it is unique.
We now return to Carroll's scoring notion to clarify what is meant by the sequential nature of the switches, and to clarify by example that one switch changes only one voter's preferences. The (Dodgson) score of any Condorcet winner is 0. If a candidate is not a Condorcet winner, but one switch (recall that a switch is an exchange of two adjacent candidates in the preference order of one voter) would make the candidate a Condorcet winner, then the candidate has a score of 1. If a candidate does not have a score of 0 or 1, but two switches would make the candidate a Condorcet winner, then the candidate has a score of 2. Note that the two switches could both be in the same voter's preferences, or could be one in one voter's preferences and one in another voter's preferences. Note also that switches are sequential. For example, with two switches, one could change a single voter's preferences from
where e Ͻ f will denote the preference: "f is strictly preferred to e." With two switches, one could also change a single voter's preferences from ͗a Ͻ b Ͻ c Ͻ d͘ to ͗b Ͻ a Ͻ d Ͻ c͘. With two switches (not one), one could also change two voters with initial preferences of ͗a Ͻ b Ͻ c Ͻ d͘ and ͗a Ͻ b Ͻ c Ͻ d͘ to the new preferences ͗b Ͻ a Ͻ c Ͻ d͘ and ͗b Ͻ a Ͻ c Ͻ d͘. As noted earlier in this section, Dodgson scores of 3, 4, etc., are defined analogously, that is, the Dodgson score of a candidate is the smallest number of sequential switches needed to make the given candidate a Condorcet winner. (We note in passing that Dodgson was before his time in more ways than one. His definition is closely related to an important concept that is now known in computer science as "edit-distance"-the minimum number of operations (from some specified set of operations) required to transform one string into another. Though Carroll's single "switch" operation is not the richer set of operations most commonly used today when doing string-to-string editing (see, e.g., Sankoff and Kruskal [1983] ), it does form a valid basis operation for transforming between permutations, which after all are what preferences are.) Bartholdi et al. [1989] define a number of decision problems related to Carroll's system. They prove that given preference lists, and a candidate, and a number k, it is NP-complete to determine whether the candidate's score is at most k in the election specified by the preference lists (they call this problem DodgsonScore). They define the problem DodgsonRanking to be the problem of determining, given preference lists and the names of two voters, c and d, whether c ties-or-defeats d. They prove that this problem is NP-hard. They also prove that, given a candidate and preference lists, it is NP-hard to determine whether the candidate is a winner of the election.
For the formal definitions of these three decision problems, a preference order is strict (i.e., irreflexive and antisymmetric), transitive, and complete. Since we will freely identify voters with their preference orders, and two different voters can have the same preference order, we define a set of voters as a multiset of preference orders.
We will say that ͗C, c, V͘ is a Dodgson triple if C is a set of candidates, c is a member of C, and V is a multiset of preference orders on C. Throughout this paper, we assume that, as inputs, multisets are coded as lists, that is, if there are m voters in the voter set then V ϭ ͗P 1 , P 2 , . . . , P m ͘, where P i is the preference order of the ith voter. Score(͗C, c, V͘) will denote the Dodgson score of c in the vote specified by C and V. If X is a decision problem, then when we speak of an instance of X we mean a string that satisfies the syntactic conditions listed in the "Instance" field of the problem's definition (or implicit in that field in order for the problem to be syntactically well formed-for example, preference lists must be over the right number and right set of candidates). As is standard, since all such syntactic conditions in our decision problems are trivially checkable in deterministic polynomial time, this is equivalent to the language definitions that are also common; in particular, the language corresponding to decision problem X is the set { x͉x is an instance of X, and the "Question" of decision problem X has the answer "yes" for x}. Since reductions map between sets, whenever speaking of or constructing reductions we use this latter formalism.
Decision Problem: DodgsonScore Instance: A Dodgson triple ͗C, c, V͘; a positive integer k. Question: Is Score(͗C, c, V͘), the Dodgson score of candidate c in the election specified by ͗C, V͘, less than or equal to k?
Decision Problem: DodgsonRanking Instance: A set of candidates C; two distinguished members of C, c and d; a multiset V of preference orders on C (encoded as a list, as discussed above). Question: Does c tie-or-defeat d in the election? That is, is Score(͗C, c, V͘) Յ Score(͗C, d, V͘)?
Decision Problem: DodgsonWinner
Instance: A Dodgson triple ͗C, c, V͘. Question: Is c a winner of the election? That is, does c tie-or-defeat all other candidates in the election?
We now state the complexity of DodgsonRanking. . 1989 ], cannot be NP-complete unless the polynomial hierarchy collapses quite dramatically.
Most of the rest of the paper is devoted to working toward a proof of Theorem 3.1. Wagner has provided a useful tool for proving ⌰ 2 p -hardness, and we state his result below as Lemma 3.3. However, to be able to exploit this tool we must explore the structure of Dodgson elections. In particular, we have to learn how to control oddness and evenness of election scores, how to add election scores, and how to merge elections. We do so as Lemmas 3.4, 3.5, and 3.7, respectively. On our way toward a proof of Theorem 3.1, using Lemmas 3.3, 3.4, and 3.5 we will first establish ⌰ 2 p -hardness of a special problem that is closely related to
DodgsonRanking. This result is stated as Lemma 3.6 below. It is not hard to prove Theorem 3.1 using Lemma 3.6 and Lemma 3.7. Note that Lemma 3.7 gives more than is needed merely to establish Theorem 3.1. In fact, the way this lemma is stated even suffices to provide-jointly with Lemma 3.6 -a direct proof of the ⌰ 2 p -hardness of DodgsonWinner.
LEMMA 3.3 [WAGNER 1987 ]. Let A be some NP-complete set, and let B be any set. If there exists a polynomial-time computable function g such that, for all k Ն 1 and all strings x 1 , . . . ,
LEMMA 3.4. There exists an NP-complete set A and a polynomial-time computable function f that reduces A to DodgsonScore in such a way that, for every x ʦ ⌺*, f( x) ϭ ͗͗C, c, V͘, k͘ is an instance of DodgsonScore with an odd number of voters and
(1) if x ʦ A, then Score(͗C, c, V͘) ϭ k, and 3 Recall the comments/conventions of Section 2 regarding the handling of the arguments of variable-arity functions. Wagner did not discuss this issue, but we note that his proof remains valid under the conventions of Section 2. These conventions have been adopted as they shield Wagner's theorem from a pathological type of counterexample (involving large, variable numbers of length zero inputs (⑀) followed by one other constant-length string) noted by a referee that, without the conventions, could render Wagner's theorem true but never applicable.
Another difference in our statement of the theorem relative to Wagner's is that though we state the theorem for the class ⌰ 2 p , Wagner used the class "P bf NP ." However, this is legal as P bf NP is now known to be equal to ⌰ 2 p (see the discussion in Köbler et al. [1987, Footnote 1] ).
(2) if x ʦ ͞ A, then Score(͗C, c, V͘) ϭ k ϩ 1.
LEMMA 3.5. There exists a polynomial-time computable function DodgsonSum such that, for all k and for all ͗C 1 ,
is a Dodgson triple having an odd number of voters and such that
Lemmas 3.3, 3.4, and 3.5 together establish the ⌰ 2 p -hardness of a special problem that is closely related to the problems that we are interested in, DodgsonRanking and DodgsonWinner. Let us define the decision problem TwoElectionRanking (2ER). LEMMA 3.6. TwoElectionRanking is ⌰ 2 p -hard.
We note in passing that 2ER is in R tt p (NP). This fact follows by essentially the same argument that will be used in the proof of Theorem 3.1 to establish that theorem's upper bound. Thus, since ⌰ 2 p ϭ R tt p (NP), we have-in light of Lemma 3.6 -that 2ER is ⌰ 2 p -complete. We also note in passing that, since one can trivially rename candidates, 2ER remains ⌰ 2 p -complete in the variant in which "and such that c d" is removed from the problem's definition. In order to make the results obtained so far applicable to DodgsonRanking and DodgsonWinner, we need the following lemma that tells us how to merge two elections into a single election in a controlled manner. (͗C, c, V͘, ͗D, d, W͘) is an instance of DodgsonWinner, (ii) Merge (͗C, c, V͘, ͗D, d, W͘) ϭ ͗Ĉ , c, d, V ͘ and MergeЈ(͗C, c, V͘, ͗D, d, W͘) 
We now prove these lemmas. PROOF OF LEMMA 3.4. Bartholdi et al. [1989] prove the NP-hardness of DodgsonScore by reducing ExactCoverByThreeSets to it. However, their reduction does not have the additional properties that we need in this lemma.
We will construct a reduction from the NP-complete problem ThreeDimen-sionalMatching (3DM) [Garey and Johnson 1979] to DodgsonScore that does have the additional properties we need. Let us first give the definition of 3DM:
Decision Problem: ThreeDimensionalMatching (3DM) Instance: Sets M, W, X, and Y, where M ʕ W ϫ X ϫ Y and W, X, and Y are disjoint, nonempty sets having the same number of elements. Question: Does M contain a matching, that is, a subset MЈ ʕ M such that ʈMЈʈ ϭ ʈWʈ and no two elements of MЈ agree in any coordinate?
We now describe a polynomial-time reduction f (from 3DM to DodgsonScore) having the desired properties. Our reduction is defined by f( x) ϭ fЈ( fЉ( x)), where fЈ and fЉ are as described below. Informally, fЉ turns all inputs into a standard format (instances of 3DM having ʈMʈ Ͼ 1), and fЈ assumes its input has this format and implements the actual reduction.
Let fЉ be a polynomial-time function that has the following properties.
(1) If x is not an instance of 3DM or is an instance of 3DM having ʈMʈ Յ 1, then fЉ( x) will output an instance y of 3DM for which ʈMʈ Ͼ 1 and, furthermore, it will hold that y ʦ 3DM N x ʦ 3DM.
It is clear that such functions exist. In particular, for concreteness, let fЉ( x) be ͗{(d, e, p), (d, e, pЈ) We now describe fЈ. Let x be our input. If x is not an instance of 3DM for which ʈMʈ Ͼ 1, then fЈ( x) ϭ 0; this is just for definiteness, as due to fЉ, the only actions of fЈ that matter are when the input is an instance of 3DM for which ʈMʈ Ͼ 1. So, suppose x ϭ ͗M, W, X, Y͘ is an instance of 3DM for which ʈMʈ Ͼ 1. Let q ϭ ʈWʈ. Define fЈ(͗M, W, X, Y͘) ϭ ͗͗C, c, V͘, 3q͘ as follows: Let c, s, and t be elements not in W ഫ X ഫ Y. Let C ϭ W ഫ X ഫ Y ഫ {c, s, t} and let V consist of the following two subparts:
(1) Voters simulating elements of M. Suppose the elements of M are enumer-
(The w i are not intended to be an enumeration of W. Rather, they take on values from W as specified by M. In particular, w j may equal w k even if j k. The analogous comments apply to the x i and y i variables.) For every triple (w i , x i , y i ) in M, we will create a voter. If i is odd, we create the voter ͗s
where the elements after t are the elements of C ‫گ‬ {s, c, w i , x i , y i , t} in arbitrary order. If i is even, we do the same, except that we exchange s and t. That is, we create the voter ͗t Ͻ c Ͻ w i Ͻ x i Ͻ y i Ͻ s Ͻ . . . ͘, where the elements after s are the elements of C‫{گ‬s, c, w i , x i , y i , t} in arbitrary order.
(2) ʈMʈ Ϫ 1 voters who prefer c to all other candidates.
We will now show that f has the desired properties. It is immediately clear that fЉ and fЈ, and thus f, are polynomial-time computable. It is also clear from our construction that, for each x, f( x) is an instance of DodgsonScore having an odd number of voters since, for every instance ͗M, W, X, Y͘ of 3DM with ʈMʈ Ͼ 1, fЈ(͗M, W, X, Y͘) is an instance of DodgsonScore with ʈMʈ ϩ (ʈMʈ Ϫ 1) voters, and since fЉ always outputs instances of this form. It remains to show that, for every instance ͗M, W, X, Y͘ of 3DM with ʈMʈ Ͼ 1:
(a) if M contains a matching, then Score(͗C, c, V͘) ϭ 3q, and (b) if M does not contain a matching, then Score(͗C, c, V͘) ϭ 3q ϩ 1.
Note that if we prove this, it is clear that f has the properties (1) and (2) of Lemma 3.4, in light of the properties of fЉ. Note that, recalling that we may now assume that ʈMʈ Ͼ 1, by construction c is preferred to s and t by more than half of the voters, and is preferred to all other candidates by ʈMʈ Ϫ 1 of the 2ʈMʈ Ϫ 1 voters. Now suppose that M contains a matching MЈ. Then ʈMЈʈ ϭ q, and every element in W ഫ X ഫ Y occurs in MЈ. 3q switches turn c into a Condorcet winner as follows. For every element (w i , x i , y i ) ʦ MЈ, switch c upwards 3 times in the voter corresponding to (w i ,
Since z occurs in MЈ, c has gained one vote over z. Thus, c is preferred to z by ʈMʈ of the 2ʈMʈ Ϫ 1 voters. Since z was arbitrary, c is a Condorcet winner.
On the other hand, c's Dodgson score can never be less than 3q, because to turn c into a Condorcet winner, c needs to gain one vote over z for every z ʦ W ഫ X ഫ Y. Since c can gain only one vote over one candidate for each switch, we need at least 3q switches to turn c into a Condorcet winner. This proves condition (a).
To prove condition (b), first note that there is a "trivial" way to turn c into a Condorcet winner with 3q ϩ 1 switches: Just switch c to the top of the preference order of the first voter. The first voter was of the form ͗s Ͻ c Ͻ w 1 Ͻ x 1 Ͻ y 1 Ͻ t Ͻ . . . ͘, where the elements after t are exactly all elements in (W ഫ X ഫ Y) ‫گ‬ {w 1 , x 1 , y 1 }, in arbitrary order. Switching c upwards 3q ϩ 1 times moves c to the top of the preference order for this voter, and gains one vote for c over all candidates in W ഫ X ഫ Y, which turns c into a Condorcet winner. This shows that Score(͗C, c, V͘) Յ 3q ϩ 1, regardless of whether M has a matching or not.
Finally, note that a Dodgson score of 3q implies that M has a matching. As before, every switch has to involve c and an element of W ഫ X ഫ Y. (This is because c must gain a vote over 3q other candidates-W ഫ X ഫ Y-and so any switch involving s or t would ensure that at most 3q Ϫ 1 switches were available for gaining against the 3q members of W ഫ X ഫ Y, thus ensuring failure.) Thus, for every voter, c switches at most three times to become a Condorcet winner. Since c has to gain one vote in particular over each element in Y, and to "reach" an element in Y it must hold that c first switches over the elements of W and X that due to our construction fall between it and the nearest y element (among the ʈMʈ voters simulating elements of M-it is clear that if any switch involves at least one of the ʈMʈ Ϫ 1 dummy voters this could never lead to a Dodgson score of 3q for c), it must be the case that c switches upwards exactly three times for exactly q voters corresponding to elements of M. This implies that the q elements of M that correspond to these q voters form a matching, thus proving condition (b). e PROOF OF LEMMA 3.5. This is trivial if k ϭ 1 so we henceforth assume that k Ͼ 1. We define
where Ĉ , c, and V will be as constructed in this proof.
Let c ϭ c 1 . Without loss of generality (by renaming if needed), we assume that c 1 ϭ c 2 ϭ . . . ϭ c k , and that (@i, j) [i j f C i പ C j ϭ {c}]. Also, for each i, enumerate C i ‫{گ‬c} as {c i,1 , c i,2 , . . . , c i,ʈC i ʈϪ1 }. To make our preference orders easier to read, whenever in a preference order we write in the text " 3 C i ," this should be viewed as being replaced by the text string "
As our candidate set, we will take all the old candidates from the given elections, that is, ͕c, c 1,1 , c 1,2 , . . . , c 1,ʈC 1 ʈϪ1 , c 2,1 , c 2,2 , . . . , c 2,ʈC 2 ʈϪ1 , · · · , c k,1 , c k,2 , . . . , c k,ʈC k ʈϪ1 ͖, plus a set S of new "separator" candidates, whose only purpose is to avoid interference. We will ensure that c is preferred to all elements of S by a majority of the voters.
Formally, let S ϭ {s i ͉1 Յ i Յ ¥ j ʈC j ʈ ⅐ ʈV j ʈ}, and let Ĉ ϭ S ഫ ഫ j C j . As a notational convenience, whenever in a preference order we write in the text " 3 S," this should be viewed as being replaced by the string "s 1 Ͻ s 2 Ͻ . . . Ͻ s ʈSʈ ." The voter set V consists of two subparts-voters simulating voters from the underlying elections, and voters who are "normalizing" voters. The total number of voters will be (2 ¥ j ʈV j ʈ) Ϫ 1, which is odd as required by the statement of the lemma being proven. We now describe the simulating voters (the cases of 1 and k are exactly analogous to the other cases, but are stated separately just for notational reasons): -There will be voters simulating the voters of V 1 . In particular, for each voter ͗e 1 Ͻ e 2 Ͻ . . . Ͻ e ʈC 1 ʈ ͘ in V 1 , we create a voter ͗ S 3 Ͻ C 2 3 Ͻ · · · Ͻ C k 3 Ͻ e 1 Ͻ e 2 Ͻ · · · Ͻ e ʈC 1 ʈ ͘.
Note that c is one of the e j 's.
-For each i, 1 Ͻ i Ͻ k, there will be voters simulating the voters of V i . In particular, for each i, 1 Ͻ i Ͻ k, and for each voter
-There will be voters simulating the voters of V k . In particular, for each voter ͗e 1 Ͻ e 2 Ͻ . . . Ͻ e ʈC k ʈ ͘ in V k , we create a voter
For each i, we want c's behavior with respect to candidates in C i to depend only on voters that simulate V i . That is, every candidate in C i ‫{گ‬c} should be preferred to c by exactly half of the voters in V that do not simulate V i . To accomplish this, we add (¥ j ʈV j ʈ) Ϫ 1 normalizing voters.
-There will be (¥ j ʈV j ʈ) Ϫ 1 normalizing voters. Each normalizing voter will have preferences of the form "some of the C j 3 's" Ͻ c Ͻ S 3 Ͻ "the rest of the C j 3 's."
Within the "some of" and "rest of" blocks, the order of the candidates can be arbitrary. So all that remains to do is to specify, for each particular one of the normalizing voters, how to decide which 3 C j 's go to the left of c (the "some of" block), and which go to the right of 3 S (the "rest of" block). Let us do so. Let the normalizing voters be named 1 , . . . , (¥ j ʈV j ʈ)Ϫ1 . Consider normalizing voter q . Then, for each i, in the preference of q let it be the case that
and otherwise 3 C i goes to the left of c. Note that, for each i, exactly ʈV i ʈ/ 2 ϩ ¥ j i ʈV j ʈ normalizing voters will have 3 C i to the right of S and exactly ʈV i ʈ/ 2 normalizing voters will have 3 C i to the left of c.
Recall that c ϭ c 1 ϭ . . . ϭ c k . We have to prove that ¥ j Score(͗C j , c, V j ͘) ϭ Score (͗Ĉ , c, V ͘) .
First note that c is preferred to each candidate in S by ¥ j ʈV j ʈ of the (2 ¥ j ʈV j ʈ) Ϫ 1 voters in V . Also, for each i, it holds that c is preferred to all candidates in C i ‫{گ‬c} by exactly half of the voters that do not simulate V i . To see this, note that c is preferred to each candidate in C i ‫{گ‬c} by all voters that simulate a V j with j i, and is also preferred by ʈV i ʈ/ 2 of the normalizing voters. Thus, c is preferred to each candidate in C i ‫{گ‬c} by (¥ j i ʈV j ʈ) ϩ ʈV i ʈ/ 2 of the (¥ j i ʈV j ʈ) ϩ (¥ j ʈV j ʈ) Ϫ 1 voters not simulating V i , which indeed is exactly half of the voters not simulating V i (recall that ʈV i ʈ is odd).
For each i, let K i ϭ Score(͗C i , c, V i ͘). Then after K i switches in V i , c is preferred to e by more than ʈV i ʈ/ 2 voters in V i , for each e ʦ C i ‫{گ‬c}. This implies that after the analogous K i switches in V (i.e., in the voters in V that simulate V i ), c is preferred to e by more than ʈV i ʈ/ 2 voters in that part of V that simulates V i , for each e ʦ C i ‫{گ‬c}, and thus by more than half of the voters in V . It follows that ¥ j K j switches in voters of V turn c into a Condorcet winner. This proves that Score(͗Ĉ , c, V ͘) Յ ¥ j Score(͗C j , c, V j ͘).
It remains to show that Score(͗Ĉ , c, V ͘) Ն ¥ j Score(͗C j , c, V j ͘). Let K ϭ Score(͗Ĉ , c, V ͘). Then K switches in V turn c into a Condorcet winner. If K Ն ʈSʈ, then K Ͼ ¥ j Score(͗C j , c, V j ͘), since Score(͗C j , c, V j ͘) Յ ʈV j ʈ ⅐ (ʈC j ʈ Ϫ 1) and so ¥ j Score(͗C j , c, V j ͘) Յ ¥ j ʈV j ʈ ⅐ (ʈC j ʈ Ϫ 1) Ͻ ¥ j ʈV j ʈ ⅐ ʈC j ʈ ϭ ʈSʈ. So K Ն ʈSʈ is impossible, and we thus know that K Ͻ ʈSʈ. With less than ʈSʈ switches, c cannot gain extra votes over candidates in (ഫ j C j )‫{گ‬c} in normalizing voters, as can be immediately seen in light of the preferences of the normalizing voters. Also, for each i: Since c is already preferred to all candidates in C i ‫{گ‬c} by all voters that simulate V j with j i, c cannot gain extra votes over candidates in C i ‫{گ‬c} in voters simulating V j with j i. It follows that c can gain extra votes over candidates in C i ‫{گ‬c} only in voters that simulate V i . After K switches, c is still preferred to all candidates in C i ‫{گ‬c} by at most half of the voters that do not simulate V i , and at the same time, c has become a Condorcet winner. It follows that after these K switches, c is preferred to e by more than ʈV i ʈ/ 2 of the voters that simulate V i , for each e in C i ‫{گ‬c}. Let M i be the number of switches that take place in the voters of V that simulate V i . Then M i Ն Score(͗C i , c, V i ͘).
Since this argument applies for all i, it follows that
proving the lemma. e PROOF OF LEMMA 3.6. Let A and f be the NP-complete set and the reduction from Lemma 3.4, and let DodgsonSum be the function from Lemma 3.5. We seek to apply Lemma 3.3, using the A (i.e., 3DM) of Lemma 3.4 as the A of Lemma 3.3, using 2ER as the B of Lemma 3.3, and using a function g that we will define in this proof as the g of Lemma 3.3.
Let
We will write S i for the Dodgson triple ͗C i , c i , V i ͘. We will compare the Dodgson score of the sum of the even Dodgson triples with the Dodgson score of the sum of the odd Dodgson triples, that is, we will look at the value of Score͑DodgsonSum͑͗S 2 , S 4 , . . . , S 2k ͒͒͘ Ϫ Score͑DodgsonSum͑͗S 1 , S 3 , . . . , S 2kϪ1 ͒͒͘.
By Lemma 3.5, this is the same as 1ՅiՅk ͑Score͑S 2i ͒ Ϫ Score͑S 2iϪ1 ͒͒.
Recall that A ( x 1 ) Ն . . . Ն A ( x 2k ). If ʈ{i͉x i ʦ A}ʈ is even then, for all i, 1 Յ i Յ k, it holds that x 2iϪ1 ʦ A N x 2i ʦ A. So, by Lemma 3.4, for each i, either Score(S 2iϪ1 ) ϭ K 2iϪ1 and Score(S 2i ) ϭ K 2i , or Score(S 2iϪ1 ) ϭ K 2iϪ1 ϩ 1 and Score(S 2i ) ϭ K 2i ϩ 1. It follows that, for each i, 1 Յ i Յ k,
On the other hand, if ʈ{i͉x i ʦ A}ʈ is odd then, for some j, 1 Յ j Յ k, x 2jϪ1 ʦ A and x 2j ʦ ͞ A and, for all i j, 1 Յ i Յ k, it holds that x 2iϪ1 ʦ A N x 2i ʦ A. It follows that Score(S 2j ) Ϫ Score(S 2jϪ1 ) ϭ 1 ϩ K 2j Ϫ K 2jϪ1 and, for all
if ʈ͕i͉x i ʦ A͖ʈ is even, and if ʈ͕i͉x i ʦ A͖ʈ is odd.
This implies that ʈ{i͉x i ʦ A}ʈ is odd if and only if
For any integer m Ն 1, define a Dodgson triple
Then, T m has an odd number of voters (namely one), and Score(T m ) ϭ m. Thus, again by Lemma 3.5, ʈ{i͉x i ʦ A}ʈ is odd if and only if
Given x 1 , . . . , x 2k , define the function g( x 1 , . . . , x 2k ) ϭ ͗͗C, c, V͘, ͗D, d, W͘͘, where ͗C, c, V͘ ϭ DodgsonSum͑͗S 1 , S 3 , . . . , S 2kϪ1 , T 1ϩ͚ 1ՅiՅk K 2i ͒͘ and ͗D, d, W͘ ϭ DodgsonSum͑͗S 2 , S 4 , . . . , S 2k , T ͚ 1ՅiՅk K 2iϪ1 ͒͘, and (without loss of generality, via trivial renaming if necessary) c d. Note that g( x 1 , . . . , x 2k ) is computable in time polynomial in ͉x 1 ͉ ϩ ͉x 2 ͉ ϩ . . . ϩ ͉x 2k ͉ ϩ 2k (recall the conventions regarding variable-arity functions discussed in Section 2 and Footnote 3). Since Score͑͗C, c, V͒͘ Յ Score͑͗D, d, W͒͘ N ʈ͕i͉x i ʦ A͖ʈ is odd, it follows by Lemma 3.3 that the problem 2ER is ⌰ 2 p -hard. e PROOF OF LEMMA 3.7. Without loss of generality, we assume that ʈVʈ Ն ʈWʈ and that C പ D ϭ . Also, enumerate C ‫گ‬ {c} as {c 1 , c 2 , . . . , c ʈCʈϪ1 }, and D‫{گ‬d} as {d 1 , d 2 , . . . , d ʈDʈϪ1 }.
The construction and proof are similar in flavor to the construction and proof of Lemma 3.5. However, in this proof, the number of voters has to be even, as we seek to ensure that c is preferred to d by exactly half of the voters.
We define a set of "separating" candidates: S ϭ {s i ͉1 Յ i Յ 2(ʈCʈ ⅐ ʈVʈ ϩ ʈDʈ ⅐ ʈWʈ)}. We will also use another set of separating candidates, T ϭ {t i ͉1 Յ i Յ ʈSʈ}, of the same cardinality as S. Let m ϭ ʈSʈ/ 2. Let Ĉ ϭ C ഫ D ഫ S ഫ T. The set of new voters V consists of the following subparts:
(a) Voters simulating V: for each voter ͗e 1 Ͻ e 2 Ͻ . . . Ͻ e ʈCʈ ͘ in V, we create a voter
(b) Voters simulating W: for each voter ͗e 1 Ͻ e 2 Ͻ . . . Ͻ e ʈDʈ ͘ in W, we create a voter
In addition, we create ʈVʈ ϩ 1 normalizing voters (recall that ʈVʈ and ʈWʈ are both odd), consisting of three subparts:
(e) ʈWʈ/ 2 voters:
The above construction of Ĉ and V defines our functions Merge (͗C, c, V͘, ͗D, d, W͘) ϭ ͗Ĉ , c, d, V ͘ and MergeЈ(͗C, c, V͘, ͗D, d, W͘) ϭ ͗Ĉ , c, V ͘. These functions clearly satisfy properties (i) and (ii) of Lemma 3.7.
To satisfy properties (iii) and (iv), we have to prove that Score(͗Ĉ , c, V ͘) ϭ Score(͗C, c, V͘) ϩ 1 and that Score(͗Ĉ , d, V ͘) ϭ Score(͗D, d, W͘) ϩ 1.
First note that c is preferred to every candidate in (S ഫ D)‫{گ‬d} by ʈVʈ ϩ ʈVʈ/ 2 ϩ ʈWʈ/ 2 of the 2ʈVʈ ϩ ʈWʈ ϩ 1 voters in V . Similarly, d is preferred to every candidate in (S ഫ C)‫{گ‬c} by ʈWʈ ϩ ʈVʈ ϩ 1 of the 2ʈVʈ ϩ ʈWʈ ϩ 1 voters in V . Similarly, c is preferred to each t ʦ T by all voters in V , and d is preferred to each t ʦ T by ʈVʈ ϩ ʈWʈ ϩ 1 of the 2ʈVʈ ϩ ʈWʈ ϩ 1 voters in V .
In addition, c is preferred to all candidates in C‫{گ‬c} by ʈVʈ/ 2 ϩ ʈWʈ/ 2 ϭ (ʈVʈ ϩ ʈWʈ)/ 2 ϩ 1 of the ʈVʈ ϩ ʈWʈ ϩ 1 voters that do not simulate V. Likewise, d is preferred to all candidates in D‫{گ‬d} by ʈVʈ ϩ 1 of the 2ʈVʈ ϩ 1 voters not simulating W. Finally, c is preferred to d by ʈVʈ ϩ ʈWʈ/ 2 ϭ (2ʈVʈ ϩ ʈWʈ ϩ 1)/ 2 of the 2ʈVʈ ϩ ʈWʈ ϩ 1 voters in V -exactly half.
Let K ϭ Score (͗C, c, V͘) . Then after K switches in V , c is preferred to e by more than ʈVʈ/ 2 voters in that part of V that simulates V, for every e ʦ C‫{گ‬c}, and thus by more than half of the voters in V . It follows that after K switches, c is preferred to e by a majority of voters, for all e ʦ Ĉ ‫{گ‬c, d}. If, in addition to these K switches, we switch c and d in a normalizing voter of the form ͗t
then c has become a Condorcet winner. Thus, Score(͗Ĉ , c, V ͘) Յ K ϩ 1 ϭ Score(͗C, c, V͘) ϩ 1. In exactly the same way, we can show that Score(͗Ĉ , d, V ͘) Յ Score(͗D, d, W͘) ϩ 1.
It remains to show that Score(͗Ĉ , c, V ͘) Ն Score(͗C, c, V͘) ϩ 1 and that Score(͗Ĉ , d, V ͘) Ն Score(͗D, d, W͘) ϩ 1. Let K ϭ Score(͗Ĉ , c, V ͘). Then K switches in V turn c into a Condorcet winner. Recall that m ϭ ʈSʈ/ 2. If K Ն m, then K Ͼ Score(͗C, c, V͘) ϩ 1, since Score(͗C, c, V͘) Ͻ ʈCʈ ⅐ ʈVʈ Ͻ m (recall ʈWʈ is odd and thus nonzero, and without loss of generality we assume ʈDʈ Ͼ 0). So K Ն m is impossible, which implies that K Ͻ m. In order to become a Condorcet winner, c in particular needs to gain one vote over d. With less than m switches, the only way in which c can gain this vote is by switching c and d in a normalizing voter of the form
This uses one of the K switches.
With less than m switches, c cannot gain extra votes over candidates in C ‫گ‬ {c} in normalizing voters, or in voters that simulate W. It follows that c can gain extra votes over candidates in C ‫گ‬ {c} only in voters that simulate V. After K switches, c is still preferred to all candidates in C ‫گ‬ {c} by at most the smallest possible majority of the (odd) number of voters that do not simulate V, and at the same time, c has become a Condorcet winner. Since ʈVʈ is odd, it follows that, after these K switches, c is preferred to e by more than ʈVʈ/ 2 voters that simulate V, for every e in C ‫گ‬ {c}. Let K V be the number of switches that take place in the voters of V that simulate V. Then K V Ն Score (͗C, c, V͘) . Since we had to use one switch to switch c and d in a normalizing voter,
The same argument can be used to show that
which proves properties (iii) and (iv).
Finally, we prove property (v) of the lemma: For each e ʦ Ĉ ‫گ‬ {c, d}, Score(͗Ĉ , c, V ͘) Ͻ Score(͗Ĉ , e, V ͘). First note that we have chosen S sufficiently large to ensure that Score(͗Ĉ , c, V ͘) Ͻ m, since Score(͗C, c, V͘) Ͻ ʈCʈ ⅐ ʈVʈ Ͻ m and Score(͗Ĉ , c, V ͘) ϭ Score(͗C, c, V͘) ϩ 1 by property (iii).
Consider t ʈTʈ . In order to become a Condorcet winner, t ʈTʈ must in particular outpoll d in pairwise elections. In the specified preferences, t ʈTʈ is preferred to d by ʈVʈ of the 2ʈVʈ ϩ ʈWʈ ϩ 1 voters in V. Thus, more than ʈWʈ/ 2 of the voters not simulating V must be convinced to prefer t ʈTʈ to d. However, to gain even one additional vote over d amongst the voter groups (b), (c), (d), and (e), t ʈTʈ would require more than m switches upwards. Since Score(͗Ĉ , c, V͘) Ͻ m, the score of c is less than that of t ʈTʈ . The same argument applies to any t i , 1 Յ i Յ ʈTʈ.
Consider s ʈSʈ . In order to become a Condorcet winner, s ʈSʈ must in particular outpoll c in pairwise elections. Initially, s ʈSʈ is preferred to c by ʈWʈ ϩ ʈVʈ/ 2 Ϫ ʈWʈ/ 2 ϭ ʈVʈ/ 2 ϩ ʈWʈ/ 2 Ϫ 1 voters, namely those belonging to (b) and (c). Thus, more than ʈVʈ/ 2 of the voters amongst (a), (d), and (e) must be convinced to prefer s ʈSʈ to c. However, to gain one more vote over c in (a), s ʈSʈ would need more than m switches upwards. Likewise, for s ʈSʈ to gain one more vote over c in (d), it would also have to switch more than m times upwards. Finally, to gain one more vote over c in (e), s ʈSʈ needs only two switches per vote. However, since there are no more than ʈWʈ/ 2 Յ ʈVʈ/ 2 voters in (e) and s ʈSʈ needs to be preferred over c by more than ʈVʈ/ 2 additional voters, s ʈSʈ cannot become a Condorcet winner by changing only the minds of the voters in (e). It follows that Score(͗Ĉ , c, V ͘) Ͻ Score(͗Ĉ , s ʈSʈ , V ͘).
Consider s 1 . As above, for s 1 to become a Condorcet winner, more than ʈVʈ/ 2 of the voters amongst (a), (d), and (e) must be convinced to prefer s 1 to c in particular. Now, to gain one vote in either (a) or (e) requires more than m switches. However, similarly to the previous paragraph, the remaining ʈVʈ/ 2 voters in (d) alone are too few to make s 1 a Condorcet winner. It follows that Score(͗Ĉ , c, V ͘) Ͻ Score (͗Ĉ , s 1 , V ͘) . Note that for each s ʦ S ‫گ‬ {s 1 , s ʈSʈ }, at least one of the two given arguments (the one for s ʈSʈ and the one for s 1 ) apply, yielding Score(͗Ĉ , c, V ͘) Ͻ Score (͗Ĉ , s, V ͘) , since each such s needs more than m switches (because m ϭ ʈSʈ/ 2) to gain one vote in either (d) or (e).
Finally, consider d ʈDʈϪ1 . As was the case for the elements of S, more than ʈVʈ/ 2 of the voters amongst (a), (d), and (e) must be convinced to prefer d ʈDʈϪ1 to c in order for d ʈDʈϪ1 to become a Condorcet winner. However, more than m switches would be required to gain even one vote from one of (a), (d), or (e). Thus, Score(͗Ĉ , c, V ͘) Ͻ Score(͗Ĉ , d ʈDʈϪ1 , V ͘). The same argument applies to each element in (C ഫ D)‫{گ‬c, d}. To summarize, we have shown that property (v) holds. e
Having proven these lemmas, we may now turn to the proof of the Theorem 3.1. PROOF OF THEOREM 3.1. To prove the ⌰ 2 p -completeness of DodgsonRanking, we must according to the definition prove both an upper bound (Dodgson-Ranking ʦ ⌰ 2 p ) and a lower bound (DodgsonRanking is ⌰ 2 p -hard). To prove the lower bound, it suffices to provide a Յ m p -reduction, f, from 2ER to DodgsonRanking. f is defined as follows. Let t o be some fixed string that is not in DodgsonRanking. f( x) is defined as being t o if x is not an instance of 2ER, and as being Merge( x 1 , x 2 ) otherwise, where x ϭ ͗x 1 , x 2 ͘ and Merge is as defined in Lemma 3.7. Note that Merge and thus f are polynomial-time computable. Note also that for any instance ͗͗C, c, V͘, ͗D, d, W͘͘ of 2ER, it holds that if ͗Ĉ , c, d, V ͘ ϭ Merge (͗C, c, V͘, ͗D, d, W͘) , then ͗͗C, c, V͘, ͗D, d, W͘͘ ʦ 2ER N ͗Ĉ , c, d, V ͘ ʦ DodgsonRanking by properties (iii) and (iv) of Lemma 3.7. Note also that for any input x that is not an instance of 2ER, f( x) maps to t o , a string that is not in DodgsonRanking. Thus, f is a Յ m p -reduction from 2ER to DodgsonRanking. From Lemma 3.6, ⌰ 2 p -hardness of DodgsonRanking follows immediately. Finally, we claim that DodgsonRanking is in ⌰ 2 p . This can be seen as follows: We can in parallel ask all plausible DodgsonScore queries for each of the two designated candidates, say c and d, and from this compute the exact score of each of c and d and thus we can tell whether c ties-or-defeats d. Note that there is a polynomial upper bound on the highest possible score (this is what was meant above by "plausible"), and thus this procedure indeed can be implemented via a polynomial-time truth-table reduction to the NP-complete set Dodgson-Score. However, the class of languages accepted via polynomial-time truth-table reductions to NP sets coincides with ⌰ 2 p [Hemachandra 1989; Köbler et al. 1987 ]. This establishes the upper bound, that is, that DodgsonRanking ʦ ⌰ 2 p . e
DodgsonWinner is similarly ⌰ 2 p -complete.
THEOREM 3.8. DodgsonWinner is ⌰ 2 p -complete. COROLLARY 3.9. If DodgsonWinner is NP-complete, then PH ϭ NP.
Bartholdi et al. [1989] have stated without proof that DodgsonRanking Յ m p DodgsonWinner. Theorem 3.1 plus this assertion would prove Theorem 3.8. However, as we wish our proof to be complete, we now prove Theorem 3.8. (We note in passing that our paper implicitly provides an indirect proof of their assertion. In particular, given that one has proven Theorem 3.1 and Theorem 3.8, the assertion follows, since it follows from the definition of ⌰ 2 p -completeness that all ⌰ 2 p -complete problems are Յ m p -interreducible.) PROOF OF THEOREM 3.8. As in the case of DodgsonRanking, Dodgson-Winner ʦ ⌰ 2 p is easily seen to hold, since we can in parallel ask all plausible DodgsonScore queries for each of the given candidates (note that the number of candidates and the highest possible score for each candidate are both polynomially bounded in the input length) and thus can compute the exact Dodgson score for each candidate. After having done so, it is easy to decide whether or not the designated candidate c ties-or-defeats all other candidates in the election. This proves the upper bound.
To prove the lower bound, we will provide a polynomial-time many-one reduction from 2ER to DodgsonWinner. By Lemma 3.6, the claim of this theorem then follows. In fact, the following function f provides a polynomialtime many-one reduction from 2ER to DodgsonWinner. Let t o be some fixed string that is not in DodgsonWinner. f( x) is defined as being t o if x is not an instance of 2ER, and as being MergeЈ( x 1 , x 2 ) otherwise, where x ϭ ͗x 1 , x 2 ͘ and MergeЈ is as defined in Lemma 3.7. To see that this is correct, note that f is polynomial-time computable, and that when x is not an instance of 2ER, then f( x) is not in DodgsonWinner.
We now turn to the behavior of f( x) when x is an instance of 2ER. Given any pair of Dodgson triples, ͗C, c, V͘ and ͗D, d, W͘, for which both ʈVʈ and ʈWʈ are odd and c d, let ͗Ĉ , c, V ͘ ϭ MergeЈ (͗C, c, V͘, ͗D, d, W͘) . Assume Score(͗C, c, V͘) Յ Score (͗D, d, W͘) . By properties (iii) and (iv) of Lemma 3.7, it follows that Score(͗Ĉ , c, V ͘) Յ Score(͗Ĉ , d, V ͘) as well. However, since by property (v) of Lemma 3.7 Score(͗Ĉ , c, V ͘) Ͻ Score(͗Ĉ , e, V ͘) for every e ʦ Ĉ ‫گ‬ {c, d}, it follows that c is a winner of the election specified by Ĉ and V . Conversely, assume Score(͗C, c, V͘) Ͼ Score (͗D, d, W͘) . Again, properties (iii) and (iv) of Lemma 3.7 imply that Score(͗Ĉ , c, V ͘) Ͼ Score(͗Ĉ , d, V ͘). Thus, c is not a winner of the election specified by Ĉ and V . e Finally, recall that our multisets are specified as a list containing, for each voter, the preference order of that voter. Our main theorem, Theorem 3.8, proves that checking if a candidate is a Dodgson winner is ⌰ 2 p -complete. Is this complexity coming from the number of candidates, or is the problem already complex with, for example, fixed numbers of candidates? In fact, for each fixed constant k, there clearly is a polynomial-time algorithm to compute all Dodgson scores, and thus all Dodgson winners, in elections having at most k candidates. Proposition 3.10 in no way conflicts with Theorem 3.8. In fact, though each A k is a polynomial-time algorithm, the degree of the polynomial runtimes of the A k is itself exponential in k. It is also known that, for each fixed constant k, there is
